of skin abnormalities. In October 1996, investigators from the Maryland Department of Natural Resources (MDNR) collected fish for pathological analyses and, as a precautionary measure, collected samples of the sediments and water column in the vicinity of the reported problems to see whether they contained Pfiesteria piscicida. Maryland's sampling protocol for Pfiesteria had been in place for unexplained fish kills or fish health events since 1993, soon after the potential effects of this organism, which was found in Chesapeake Bay in 1992 and 1993, became widely known (Lewitus et al. 1995) .
No obvious problems with water quality were evident, and analyses of the water and sediment samples, performed by Karen Steidinger of the Florida Marine Research Institute, did not reveal the presence of Pfiesteria (K. Steidinger, personal communication, 1997) . Dr. Steidinger had tested the live (unpreserved) water and sediment samples using light microscopy before and after incubation of the samples; she also used algal prey to increase the numbers of heterotrophic dinoflagellates. Fungi and bacteria were identified from the samples of the fish lesions, but these were not thought to be the primary cause of the lesions (Jordan and May 1998) . Because fish were not being harvested during the winter, concern subsided and no samples were taken; it therefore remains unknown whether fish health problems persisted through the winter.
In spring 1997, reports of high proportions of fish with a variety of large external anomalies, including a number of different species with deep ulcerative lesions and unnatural growths of tissue, once again started to come from watermen working the lower Pocomoke River. This time, they also reported various ailments affecting their own health, including cold-like symptoms, skin problems, and generally poor health. The highest incidences of fish with external anomalies-up to 40% (MDNR 1997 )-were reported for fish caught in pound nets and bank traps; these devices direct fish into a holding area where they are trapped in a confined space for hours to days, depending on how often the device is tended. Fish collected through a limited trawling effort in April and May 1997 revealed no obvious skin lesions in three of five surveys, but in the other two, 2% and 6% of the total fish catch had lesions (MDNR 1997) . During this period, the highest in- cidence of lesions-9%-was for white perch (Morone americana) (MDNR 1997) .
In response to the findings of fish health problems, the MDNR convened an Interagency Study Team of state agency scientists in April 1997 to review alternative hypotheses concerning the cause of these problems. Given the scientific complexities of the situation and emerging public debate, as chair of the Interagency Study Team I recommended to the MDNR secretary that an outside Technical Advisory Committee (TAC) be established to help state agencies interpret available facts. The TAC was formed early that summer under the leadership of Donald F. Boesch, president of the University of Maryland Center for Environmental Science.
Early hypotheses to explain the cause of the fish anomalies included a number of stresses that could be related to the very high freshwater flows affecting this area and the whole of the Chesapeake Bay during 1996 and the early months of 1997. Based on long-term monitoring data close to the affected area (MDNR 1998) , depressed salinity and pH were identified as two of those potential flow-related stressors. The possibility that HAB species, such as P. piscicida, could be involved was also raised, along with the stress to fish caused by confinement in nets. Toxic contaminants, brought into the system by high runoff from surrounding agricultural lands, were also considered as possible stressors. However, in these early stages of the investigation, no single hypothesis could be well supported.
Pfiesteria is found
By early May, media attention on the diseased fish and human health concerns had grown significantly and regular reports were appearing on television and in major newspapers throughout the region, including the large population centers of Washington, DC, and Baltimore. Then a bombshell hit. A television reporter from Washington, DC (Brad Bell of WJLA, an ABC affiliate), worked with watermen to collect a water sample from the lower Pocomoke River on 6 May 1997 and sent the sample to JoAnn Burkholder, an internationally recognized expert on Pfiesteria at North Carolina State University (Burkholder and Glasgow 2001) .
Several days later, Dr. Burkholder described in a televised news report on WJLA that she had found P. piscicida in the sample from the Pocomoke. Since this was what many had suspected and feared, the issue jumped to the front pages of newspapers and lead stories of televised news reports, to remain there regularly until fall. The publication of a book on P. piscicida and related scientific and political issues in North Carolina, And the Waters Turned to Blood (Barker 1997) , helped to both raise awareness and stir fears about this organism. The book highlighted some of the bizarre biological characteristics of P. piscidida, the threat to human health, and the efforts by government officials to downplay the potential significance of the organism in North Carolina. Reading in the book that state officials in North Carolina were averse to admitting the role of Pfiesteria in fish and human health problems, many people were inclined to believe that Maryland officials were taking a similar tack. At this point, MDNR Secretary John Griffin contacted Dr. Burkholder to request her assistance in the state's investigations.
As May came to a close, there was no scientific consensus on the cause of the obvious fish health problems or the suspected human health problems. This scientific uncertainty led to rampant speculation about causes and effects. A number of environmentalists, watermen, and reporters attributed all of the fish and human health problems to Pfiesteria. Broad media attention fanned the flames of uncertainty at a time when citizens of the region were turning to the Chesapeake Bay as a source of recreation, tourism, and seafood. State officials were coming under increasing pressure to determine the cause of reported health problems and to take action, but they were able to respond only in generalities, saying the state was "giving this issue the highest priority" and "conducting intensive studies."
A public meeting was held on the evening of 28 May 1997, several miles from the Pocomoke River. At that meeting, watermen were outspoken about their concerns for both their health and that of the fishery. Close to 100 people were in attendance, including Maryland health and environmental officials and representatives from most of the major television stations and newspapers in Washington and Baltimore. Because there was no official, definitive explanation for the environmental and human health problems, despite the finding of Pfiesteria in the Pocomoke River, some members of the public and media believed that Maryland agencies were withholding information. The Pfiesteria crisis had begun.
Intensive investigations are initiated
During May 1997, the Pfiesteria Study Team (PST) (previously known as the Interagency Study Team) finalized plans for an intensive study of the Pocomoke River and assembled the resources to conduct it, at great cost to ongoing projects and normal work weeks. Plans were made to sample fish with multiple gear types, record any externally visible anomalies, and take samples of diseased tissues for pathological analysis. Fish tissues were to be collected for contaminant analysis. Intensive water quality sampling for a broad suite of physical and chemical variables was to be conducted at 21 stations from Pocomoke Sound, adjacent to the Chesapeake Bay mainstem, to the town of Snow Hill (see Figure 1) . At a subset of water quality stations, additional sampling was planned to search for Pfiesteria and other potentially harmful algal species and potentially toxic contaminants. Plans were also made to evaluate pollutant inputs from the watershed, based on existing modeling studies, examination of permitted wastewater discharge facilities, and selected inspections of point and nonpoint sources that might have been having a large influence on the Pocomoke River.
On 15 June, Maryland officially launched its investigations of the Pocomoke River with a boat tour for reporters. The investigation had now moved to a much more intensive level and public expectations for quick and certain answers grew. In the early weeks of the intensive studies, more details were added to the patchwork of assembled data. Trawl surveys of fish yielded relatively low incidences of externally visible anomalies, water quality did not reveal any obvious problems, and continued sampling for the presence of Pfiesteria was negative (K. Steidinger, personal communication, 1997) .
Despite the widespread speculation that Pfiesteria had been at the root of the problems witnessed through late spring 1997, many parts of that picture did not fit. First, the problems of the Pocomoke River were found in late fall and again in spring, when temperatures were below the range considered optimal for Pfiesteria outbreaks . Second, the types of anomalies were varied and affected numerous species (Jordan and May 1998) . In North Carolina, which had experienced toxic Pfiesteria outbreaks, Atlantic menhaden (Brevoortia tyrannus) were the primary fish affected; external lesions were characteristically deep bloody ulcers and water temperatures were generally 26°C or higher (Burkholder et al. 1992 , Burkholder and Glasgow 1997 . Therefore, in the judgment of Maryland state scientists and advisors, it was premature to conclude that Pfiesteria had been responsible for the observed fish health problems.
On 25 June, Maryland's governor, Parris Glendening, joined a boat tour of the Pocomoke River composed of local elected officials, watermen, and media representatives to demonstrate his concern about the problem in the Pocomoke River and to explain that he was taking all reasonable measures to determine its cause. Watermen brought in samples of afflicted fish and continued to complain of health problems. Despite the continuing and growing concerns, the uncertainty regarding causes of the fish and human health problems persisted through June and into July.
During June and early July, the incidence of externally visible fish anomalies in the lower Pocomoke River started to subside in the catch of watermen and remained low in the state trawling studies. Documentation of fish skin abnormalities in pound nets and bank traps in July 1997 showed externally visible lesion incidences of less than 5% but high incidences of skin abrasions, from 36% to 43% (MDNR 1997) . Trawling surveys in July showed that abrasions and lesions for all species collected (a total of 1,882 fish) amounted to less than 1% of the population (MDNR 1997) . These findings led to a general feeling that the worst of the problems had passed. However, watermen-joined now by some state staff members who had been involved in water sampling-continued to complain of health problems. Maryland health officials worked to establish contact between the watermen, their physicians, and county health department officials so that these health problems could be better understood.
Outbreaks occur and human health impacts are documented
August 1997 started with the first formal meeting of Maryland's TAC, which included a boat tour, a public meeting, and a scientific review of available data assembled by the PST. The scientific summary that emerged from this session was consistent with the conclusions assembled to date by the PSTa number of hypotheses to explain the observed fish health problems were still valid but there was no compelling evidence for a single cause (TAC 1997a) .
Three days after the TAC issued its summary, however, the situation on the Pocomoke River took a dramatic turn. On 6 August, a fish kill involving approximately 10,000-15,000 menhaden occurred on the lower Pocomoke River (Figure 1 ). The kill lasted for four days, with a decreasing number of fish affected each day. A high percentage of the fish killed, as well as many of the survivors in the vicinity, had large bloody lesions typical of similar fish kills reported in North Carolina; many fish were also exhibiting erratic swimming behavior. This time, the fish health problem had all of the hallmark signs of events in North Carolina that had been associated with toxic Pfiesteria. Extensive sampling in response to the event, in addition to the ongoing intensive investigations in the area since June, pointed to no other potential cause.
Water samples collected in the fish kill area and tested using rapid checks with light microscopy (called a "presumptive" count) showed the presence of cells that were "Pfiesteria-like," based on size and morphology. Light microscopy does not allow sufficient resolution of these tiny cells to enable species identification. That requires, instead, more time-consuming procedures using scanning electron microscopy (SEM). Counts of the Pfiesteria-like cells by Dr. Burkholder's laboratory using light microscopy showed that the abundance of these cells were high enough (up to 900 cells per ml) that, if a significant proportion of these organisms were actively toxic P. piscicida, they would have been present at sufficient densities (more than 250 cells per ml) to have been able to cause fish death Glasgow 1997, 2001 ). Fish bioassays of samples collected at the site of the fish kill were conducted in the biohazard III facilities of Dr. Burkholder's laboratory (such biohazard facilities conform with rigorous standards to protect workers from highly hazardous materials). In four days these bioassays resulted in fish death, with light microscopy confirming that a species resembling P. piscicida was present at the time of death (Burkholder and Glasgow 2001) . SEM analysis confirmed that the species present was P. piscicida (Burkholder and Glasgow 2001) . Analyses conducted by Dr. Steidinger also revealed the presence of other Pfiesteria-like organisms at the site of the Pocomoke River fish kills (MDNR 1999 ).
Maryland's policy response to the 6 August 1997 fish kill was swift and precautionary, aimed at protecting human health even though final results from all of the laboratory analyses described above were not yet available. The day of the fish kill, state and local health officials, with the involvement of the governor of Maryland, issued a public health advisory for the affected area, followed the next day by an order for river closure. The river closure order represented a conservative judgment that toxic Pfiesteria piscicida was a likely cause of the fish kill, based on the presence of sufficiently high densities of Pfiesteria-like cells to cause a fish kill, the high incidence of external lesions on both dead and living menhaden in the area, the erratic swimming behavior of surviving menhaden, and the lack of evidence for any other cause. On 13 August, four days after daily monitoring had indicated that the fish kill had ended, the river was reopened.
In the wake of the 6 August 1997 fish kill, and with human health concerns continuing to be reported, the Maryland Department of Health and Mental Hygiene assembled a team of physicians from Johns Hopkins University and the University of Maryland. On 22 August 1997 this team traveled to Pocomoke City, on the banks of the Pocomoke River, along with a representative from the federal Centers for Disease Control, to conduct tests on individuals who had been exposed to nearby waterways and later exhibited a variety of symptoms that could not easily be diagnosed.
On 26 August, approximately three weeks after the first fish kill and associated lesion event, another fish kill of approximately 10,000 menhaden occurred, accompanied by a high incidence of highly visible external lesions on both the dead fish and the remaining population. This event was in the same vicinity as the first but covered a broader area. The exact magnitude of the kill was difficult to determine because the affected area was large and unknown numbers of dead fish might have sunk from view or been preyed upon by abundant waterfowl. As in the 6 August event, samples collected during this fish kill, when observed under light microscopy, were shown to contain sufficient densities of Pfiesteria-like cells (up to 300 cells per ml) to result in fish death if they were predominantly actively toxic P. piscicida; results from a subset of these samples analyzed by Dr. Burkholder's lab showed toxicity in fish bioassays and were confirmed by SEM to contain P. piscicida, along with a number of other dinoflagellates of similar size (MDNR 1999) . In response to this second outbreak, local health departments imposed another formal closure of the river to prevent direct exposure to the potentially harmful conditions and to stop the harvest of seafood. The closure area extended further upstream than it had after the 6 August event (Figure 1 ). The river remained closed until 3 October, 14 days after signs of significant fish health problems had ceased.
Although no evidence existed that fish and shellfish from outbreak areas were toxic, little information was available to refute this perception. Because of intense media coverage of the outbreaks, with attendant accounts of a mysterious and toxic organism, seafood sales in Maryland fell sharply during the summer; to salvage sales, some stores started advertising that they sold no Maryland seafood. Economic losses due to declining seafood sales alone were estimated at $43 million (Lipton 1999) . Charter boat captains also reported that their numbers of customers were well below normal because of fears related to Pfiesteria (Lipton 1999) . In response to public fears, the state of Maryland launched a media campaign to assure consumers that Maryland seafood was safe to eat.
At the end of August came yet another bombshell: The medical team that examined patients on 22 August reported to the governor that they had found compelling evidence of a link between cognitive function and exposure to waters affected by fish health problems on Maryland's Lower Eastern Shore. The governor immediately called a press conference to release these findings to the public, even though the announcement would come at the beginning of the Labor Day weekend, a time when many would be using the bay and its tributaries for recreation. The findings of the medical team, later reported in the medical literature (Grattan et al. 1998) , further intensified media coverage and spread additional fears among citizens of the region.
Hypothesis emerges on why outbreaks may have occurred
At about the time that the medical team report was released, the first set of comprehensive data from the environmental studies was being assembled, which, together with research on Pfiesteria and existing knowledge about the watershed, allowed me to formulate a hypothesis to explain why a toxic Pfiesteria outbreak had occurred in the lower Pocomoke River in August 1997. The Pocomoke River receives high nutrient loads from a watershed whose dominant land use is agriculture. These high loadings are reflected in the river, where concentrations of nitrogen (N) and phosphorus (P) are high, including inorganic forms that are readily available to phytoplankton. These inorganic forms do not appear to be substantially reduced by phytoplankton uptake in the summer until the abundance of this community increases in the lower river as it nears Pocomoke Sound.
Part of the hypothesis suggests that, because light in the upper river is limited due to the darkly stained water (caused by dissolved organic matter from wetlands), particulate matter, and depths of approximately 4-5 m, phytoplankton growth there is inhibited, allowing the underutilized inorganic nutrient pools to be transported downriver. In the area of the fish kills and fish health problems, the river widens dramatically (Figure 1 ) and shallows to average depths of approximately 1-2 m. The shallower depths downriver, where a much larger proportion of the water column is near the surface, allows phytoplankton concentrations to increase in this nutrient-replete environment. Salinity dilution plots for the inorganic nutrient pools provide evidence of a strong sink for these fractions in the lower Pocomoke River as chlorophyll concentrations, a measure of phytoplankton concentration, increase and reach a maximum during the summer in the vicinity of the fish kills (MDNR 1998) . The region where the fish kills occurred also has salinities believed to be favorable for the growth of Pfiesteria.
The hypothesis proposes that the shallower depths of the lower river are also likely to provide a more favorable environment for the movement of Pfiesteria between the bottom sediments and water column, which is reported to happen during transformations between benign benthic and toxic pelagic life forms (Burkholder and Glasgow 1997) . The shallower water column also serves to position fish closer to the benthic environment where Pfiesteria might be better able to sense chemical signals from fish, signals that are thought to trigger the transformation to toxic forms (Burkholder and Glasgow 1997) .
The final elements of the hypothesis involve factors that could concentrate menhaden in the affected area. The hypothesis suggests that menhaden, which are phytoplankton feeders, would be more concentrated in areas where their food supply is more abundant, as shown in a study of menhaden distributions in a similar estuarine system (Friedland et al. 1996) . During summer 1997, longitudinal profiles showed that chlorophyll concentrations peaked in the fish kill areas. The second factor that could concentrate menhaden in the affected area is low dissolved oxygen in the upper river. Data collected during summer 1997 showed that dissolved oxygen concentrations were low (3-4 mg per l) surface to bottom in the upper river, extending from the tidal fresh reaches to the area just above the fish kills, where there was a sharp gradient to higher oxygen levels (greater than 5 mg per l) downriver (MDNR 1998 ). This migratory species could be blocked from moving to otherwise suitable habitat upriver by these low oxygen concentrations, and thus potentially concentrated downriver of the area of sharp longitudinal oxygen concentration change.
The major elements of the hypothesis are summarized in Figure 2 . This graphic was used extensively during public, legislative, and scientific presentations to help explain some of the environmental factors that might have set the stage for the toxic Pfiesteria outbreaks in the Pocomoke River (see, for example, Hughes et al. 1997) .
This hypothesis received favorable scientific reviews and widespread media attention when presented to the TAC immediately after Labor Day weekend in 1997 (TAC 1997b) . With the confirmation of Pfiesteria as the likely cause of the fish health problems in August, the hypothesis for the occurrence of the outbreak in the Pocomoke River, and the findings of the medical team, for the first time there was a sense that the investigations were yielding results that could reduce the uncertainties surrounding the Pfiesteria crisis.
Outbreaks spread to two other rivers
In early September in another tidal river on Maryland's Lower Eastern Shore-Kings Creek (see Figure 1 )-high percentages of menhaden were found with the deep bloody lesions characteristic of the Pocomoke River outbreaks. These fish were also behaving erratically, and some of the fish appeared to be dying. On 10 September, when water samples from this area showed relatively high (up to 315 cells per ml) presumptive counts of Pfiesteria-like cells (using light microscopy), the governor acted quickly in concert with local health officials in Somerset County to close this tributary to any boating. Toxicity was later demonstrated in fish bioassays, which identified P. piscicida as the dinoflagellate species associated with fish death (MDNR 1999) .
Just days later, on 13 September, another outbreak occurred, this time in the Chicamacomico River, a tidal river just a few miles north of the other areas affected (see Figure 1) . This event was perhaps the most revealing one, because observers at the site of the outbreak were able to witness the fish kill and toxicity event in progress instead of after the fact. Officials from the MDNR, who were on a bridge crossing at the site of the event, reported thousands of menhaden, in an area hundreds of feet upstream and about a hundred feet downstream of the bridge, writhing near the surface in obvious distress (Elizabeth Kalinowski and Michael Howard [MDNR, Annapolis, MD], personal communication, 1997) . Samples of the menhaden population showed that the majority of these fish had the typical bloody lesions observed in the previous outbreaks. Fish were dying, but the numbers were difficult to tally because most of the dead fish sank to the bottom. Most of the people at the scene of the event on 13 September complained of headaches and flu-like symptoms in the hours and days following the event (Haselow et al. 2001 ). The governor, in cooperation with local health officials in Dorchester County, closed this river on 14 September.
Water samples from the affected area of the Chicamacomico River, as in the other events, showed relatively high (up to 315 cells per ml) presumptive counts of Pfiesteria-like organisms using light microscopy. Toxicity was demonstrated in fish bioassays, and P. piscicida was definitively identified from the fish bioassays done by Dr. Burkholder's laboratory using SEM (Figure 3 ; MDNR 1999, Burkholder and Glasgow 2001) . Dr. Steidinger's laboratory cultured the water samples from this event with algal prey and also identified P. piscicida using SEM (K. Steidinger, personal communication, 1997) .
Kings Creek and the Chicamacomico River were quickly added to the monitoring effort to document water quality, habitat, and fish health. Results from these two rivers showed that those waters, like the Pocomoke, were also relatively highly enriched in nutrients, especially organic forms (Magnien et al. 1998 , MDNR 1998 , 1999 . Other than the presence of toxic Pfiesteria, no other obvious stressors to fish health were found, although the presence of another unnamed dinoflagellate from the algal assays was noted (K. Steidinger, personal communication, 1997; MDNR 1999) .
Monitoring for fish health, water quality, and Pfiesteria-like organisms continued on all three rivers through October and, following two weeks of low incidences of lesions in menhaden, each of the river closure orders was lifted. As more and more scientific information from ongoing monitoring and research became available, elements of the hypothesis advanced in early September continued to be supported. For example, the new water quality monitoring data in the affected waters showed that N, P, and algal concentrations were relatively high; where long-term (approximately 12 years) monitoring data were available in the region, they showed either no improving trends or increases in nutrient concentrations (Magnien et al. 1998 , MDNR 1999 ).
Policy debate begins in earnest
In the course of only a few days in early September, environmental symptoms associated with Pfiesteria had shown up in two additional rivers. Many people were alarmed by the apparent rapid spread of this problem, which theoretically could occur in any of the numerous other tidal rivers in the region. Scientific uncertainty about where and when an outbreak could occur fueled speculation. Although confirmed outbreaks had occurred only in North Carolina estuaries and in the three Maryland rivers, dozens of suspected outbreaks were being investigated throughout the region, many of them reported by concerned citizens. Concern over a Pfiesteriarelated outbreak affected not only Maryland but also states from Delaware to North Carolina. Several federal agencies joined the states' investigations.
In mid-September, Governor Glendening called upon Congress and President Clinton to help the region deal with this crisis. The governor also convened a summit of high-level representatives of six states and the federal government in Annapolis, Maryland, to seek regional cooperation in understanding and managing this new threat. In attendance were the governors of Virginia, Delaware, and West Virginia; representatives from North Carolina and Pennsylvania; and Administrator Carol M. Browner of the US Environmental Protection Agency. All of the states joined the federal government in signing an agreement that called for the signatories to work cooperatively on the threat of Pfiesteria and similar organisms.
Also in September, Governor Glendening appointed a "Blue Ribbon Citizens Pfiesteria Action Commission," headed by former Maryland Governor Harry Hughes, to make recommendations for managing the risks associated with Pfiesteria and minimizing the likelihood of future outbreaks of Pfiesteria or similar harmful algal blooms. Since the governor wanted recommendations in time to provide input to the upcoming legislative session, the commission was tasked with producing its report by the beginning of November 1997.
The commission conducted intensive investigations into the myriad scientific and public policy aspects of the Pfiesteria issue. Many scientific briefings were held to inform legislative committees, government committees, the public, and the scientific community.
An important scientific milestone occurred during the deliberations of the commission in the fall. At the request of the commission chairman, the president of the University of Maryland Center for Environmental Science, Donald Boesch, was asked to convene a panel of experts to evaluate the possible relationships between Pfiesteria and nutrients. The resultant consensus (Boesch 1997) indicated that there were probable links between nutrients and Pfiesteria or Pfiesterialike dinoflagellates. The panel concluded, "In the long term, decreases in nutrient loading will reduce eutrophication, thereby improving water quality, and in this context will likely lower the risk of toxic outbreaks of Pfiesteria-like dinoflagellates and harmful algal blooms" (p. 5). A similar consensus was later reached by a panel of scientists convened in North Carolina (Wright 1998) .
Another important element of the commission's deliberations was the evaluation of nutrient sources in the affected region. By the time the commission convened, the media had widely reported on the concentrated poultry industry in this area and the large amounts of animal wastes applied to cropland. Agricultural scientists presented evidence to the commission about the great excess of P in the soils of this region and suggested various ways of controlling nutrient application and runoff (Hughes et al. 1997) . Evaluation of nutrient sources from the watershed, utilizing an existing mathematical model developed by the Chesapeake Bay Program, confirmed the relatively high contribution from agricultural lands on Maryland's Lower Eastern Shore (Figure 4) . After listening to numerous scientific presentations on Pfiesteria-related environmental and medical information, various options for controlling nutrients, and opinions of many interest groups and citizens, the Commission issued its final report at the beginning of November 1997. The report contained a number of recommendations for controlling nutrients statewide (especially from agricultural sources), for increasing monitoring and surveillance, and for stepping up research (Hughes et al. 1997 ). Maryland's governor and legislators used the Commission's report extensively to pursue options for nutrient runoff controls during the 1998 legislative session.
Epilogue
In the waning days of Maryland's 1998 legislative session, landmark legislation-the Water Quality Improvement Act of 1998-was passed, requiring farmers to produce and implement nutrient management plans on all but the smallest farms in the state. It is widely believed that the requirements of this legislation make it the most comprehensive agricultural nutrient management law in the nation. The act calls for implementation to be phased in from 2002 to 2005, with the more difficult controls-phosphorus management on lands receiving animal or human waste-to be implemented last. To help implement the act, the legislature also provided tax breaks for farmers and incentive funding for demonstration projects that would explore economically viable ways of utilizing the excess animal waste on the Lower Eastern Shore.
The connections between harmful algal blooms and nutrients found in Maryland and North Carolina, along with the subsequent legislation in Maryland, also intensified the national debate on controlling nonpoint sources of pollution, especially from concentrations of animal waste (New York Times 1997, US Senate 1997). The US Department of Agriculture and the Environmental Protection Agency started to develop a "unified national strategy for animal feeding operations" shortly after the Pfiesteria crisis in Maryland and, in its final strategy report, mentions P. piscicida specifically as a threat to water quality and public health (USDA and EPA 1999) .
In addition to addressing nutrient runoff controls, the Maryland legislature provided substantial support for monitoring and research related to harmful algal blooms. The Maryland outbreaks also led to federal funding for monitoring in at least six states along the East Coast and an increase in federal research funding for Pfiesteria and related harmful algal blooms. Several eastern and Gulf Coast states likewise allocated funding for Pfiesteria-related research and monitoring.
Results of intensive monitoring and research in Maryland since 1998 have shown that Pfiesteria is relatively widespread in estuaries in drainage areas of both the Chesapeake and coastal bays, although it has been found most frequently in waters of the Lower Eastern Shore, the region affected in 1997 (MDNR 1999 (MDNR , 2000 (MDNR , 2001 . Prolonged (several weeks) outbreaks of highly visible external lesions on large numbers of menhaden, similar to those observed in 1997, have occurred each year since 1997 in localized areas, and during each of these outbreaks Pfiesteria has been found in the water column. Presumptive counts, however, were generally below densities thought to be toxic, and no toxicity could be demonstrated at the time of sampling or in subsequent bioassays in these post-1997 events.
Although the Pfiesteria crisis led to a number of specific policy decisions and additional research, probably more significant in the long run was the regional and even national attention it brought to critical interconnections between land-based pollution, environmental health, and human health. To effectively manage the immediate crisis and craft long-term solutions, experts from disciplines as diverse as agriculture, genetics, human and veterinary medicine, environmental biology and chemistry, fisheries, waste disposal, and various industries, along with government officials and legislators, needed to work together. This kind of collaboration will be required with increasing frequency to understand and solve environmental problems involving pollutants that travel considerable distances, crossing not only political jurisdictions but also different media.
Greater scientific collaboration will also be needed to understand and quantify complex physical, chemical, and biological interactions that are becoming more widely recognized as the source of deleterious impacts on environmental and human health. As our scientific understanding of these more complex phenomena expands, it is accompanied by a growing challenge to have such information incorporated into policy. Although scientific information is increasingly being incorporated into environmental policymaking, the Pfiesteria crisis demonstrated that the need is growing for mechanisms to ensure effective collaboration between the scientific community and local, state, and federal governments in evaluating environmental issues that span a wide range of disciplines. In the Pfiesteria crisis, such collaborations were accomplished through ad hoc scientific and policy committees that were driven by the pressure of a crisis atmosphere to reach consensus. The successes and limitations of the collaborative processes pursued during the Pfiesteria crisis offer valuable insights for dealing with the growing number of environmental issues that will require similar approaches in the future. coordinated and conducted various fisheries studies during the crisis. Michael Howard coordinated MDNR's Natural Resources Police activities and personally assisted in sampling and surveillance activities as needed. Elizabeth Kalinowski and John Surrick of MDNR's Public Communication Office provided superb coordination between the media and the public on behalf of the state. Charles Poukish and other staff members of the Maryland Department of the Environment assisted in emergency response, fisheries, and contaminant studies. JoAnn Burkholder, Howard Glasgow, and Karen Steidinger unhesitatingly gave extensive expert assistance to the state in all scientific matters relating to Pfiesteria. Donald Boesch, who served as chair of the Technical Advisory Committee and Cambridge Consensus, played a key role by assembling consensus within the scientific community so that state policies could be guided by the latest scientific findings. Thomas Parham of MDNR provided assistance with the figures.
